The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany? by Arzheimer, Kai
The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist
Eurosceptic Party for Germany?
Kai Arzheimer∗
Abstract
Within less than two years of being founded by disgruntled members of the governing CDU,
the newly-formed Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has already performed extraordinary
well in the 2013 General election, the 2014 EP election, and a string of state elections. Highly
unusually by German standards, it campaigned for an end to all efforts to save the Euro
and argued for a re-configuration of Germany’s foreign policy. This seems to chime with the
recent surge in far right voting in Western Europe, and the AfD was subsequently described
as right-wing populist and europhobe.
On the basis of the party’s manifesto and of hundreds of statements the party has posted
on the internet, this article demonstrates that the AfD does indeed occupy a position at the
far-right of the German party system, but it is currently neither populist nor does it belong
to the family of Radical Right parties. Moreover, its stance on European Integration is more
nuanced than expected and should best be classified as soft eurosceptic.
Germany is unusual amongst West European countries because all relevant parties (with the
possible exception of the Left party) are unwavering supporters of European integration. More-
over, while the Radical Right is now a permanent feature a of many European democracies, the
electoral successes of Germany’s Radical Right parties have been very modest and confined to the
subnational level.
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However, in 2013, only months before the General Election, a new party was formed that cam-
paigned for a dissolution of the Eurozone and a radical re-configuration of German foreign policy.
This new “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD for short) came tanta-
lisingly close to the electoral threshold of five per cent. Nine months on, the party polled seven
per cent in the 2014 European parliamentary election and was eventually admitted to the Euro-
pean Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), which further soured the relationship between
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron. In three (eastern)
state parliamentary elections held in August/September 2014, the AfD did even better, capturing
between 9.7 (Saxony) and 12.2 (Brandenburg) per cent of the vote.
The AfD has been described as eurosceptic and right-wing populist1 by its political rivals and
by the mainstream media. If this description was correct, it would signal a qualitative shift in the
structure of party competition in Germany. Moreover, due to such a party’s blackmail potential vis-
a-vis the moderate right, this would constitute a massive shock to the German party system, with
considerable implications for Germany’s future position on European integration and for German
immigration policies. It is, however not at all clear if and to what degree such a classification of the
AfD is warranted, as those terms are used rather indiscriminately in mediated discourses (Bale,
Kessel, and Taggart, 2011).
The aim of this article is therefore simply to assess the AfD based on categories derived from
the rich comparative literature on the Radical Right and on euroscepticism. Since the AfD is a
very young party with no parliamentary record, the primary source of evidence the party’s 2014
European manifesto. Additional information is drawn from material on the party’s website and
Facebook presence.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows: The next section briefly reviews the
concepts that will be used in the analyses. The third section provides some background information
on euroscepticism and right-wing radicalism in Germany, and on the short career of the AfD. The
fourth section presents an in-depth analysis of the AfD’s manifesto and other texts produced by
the party. The final section summarises the main findings and puts them into perspective.
1E.g. Stuttgarter Zeitung 18/09/2013, page 4; TAZ 02/07/2014, page 5.
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Concepts
Radical right-wing populism
In the early 1980s, a new group of right-wing parties emerged in Western Europe. These parties
differed significantly and systematically from mainstream parties of the right and were therefore
portrayed as a new party family in the scholarly literature. While there is little disagreement as to
which parties belong to this new family, research on these parties and their voters has been plagued
by the twin questions of what exactly sets these parties apart from the mainstream right, and what
adjectives (“radical”, “populist”, “extreme”, “anti-immigrant” . . . ) best capture these differences.
More recently, Mudde (2007) has proposed a new scheme for classifying right-wing parties
outside the mainstream that has won international acclaim because it accommodates a wide range
of parties while identifying important differences between them. According to Mudde (2007, p. 19),
the lowest common denominator for the party family is “nativism”, an ideology that combines
nationalism and xenophobia. Nativism is a broad concept that subsumes racism, ethnocentrism,
and anti-immigrant sentiment. Nativism holds that non-native elements (persons, ideas, or policies)
present a threat to the nation state, which should be as homogeneous as possible.
However, traces of nativism may be found within the manifestos of mainstream parties. Follow-
ing Mudde (2007, pp. 21-23), to qualify as a Radical Right, a party additionally needs to display
authoritarian tendencies, i.e. an aggressive stance towards political enemies and a preference for
a strictly ordered society, strong leadership, and severe punishments for offenders. With author-
itarianism comes a political bent that is not necessarily anti-democratic per se but goes against
the grain of some of the fundamental values and principles of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2007,
pp. 25-26) such as tolerance, pluralism, and the protection of minorities and their rights.
Within the Radical Right, Mudde then identifies a subgroup of parties that is also populist
in nature. By populism, Mudde (2007, p. 23) means not just a style of political communication
but rather a “thin ideology” (see Stanley, 2008) that pits the “pure people” against a corrupt elite
and puts majority rule above human rights and constitutional checks and balances. This Populist
Radical Right is arguably the most electorally successful subtype within the larger party family.
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Finally, a small (and not necessarily populist) subgroup of the Radical Right is actually anti-
democratic. Borrowing from the long-standing practice in Germany, Mudde labels these parties as
“Extreme Right”.
While Mudde’s system of definitions may not have ended the debate about terminology in the
field, it obviously provides a useful tool for assessing new parties, and more generally for discussing
developments in Germany within a wider European context.
Euroscepticism and ideology
Euroscepticism broadly refers to a negative stance towards European integration. As a field of sci-
entific inquiry, it only took off in the late 1990s (see Vasilopoulou, 2013) when the “Post-Maastricht
Blues” (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007) kicked in. Mudde (2012) distinguishes between two main
strands in this literature: the “North Carolina school”, which clusters around the Chapel Hill
dataset, and the “Sussex school”, which chiefly relies on case studies of party manifestos. Whereas
the “North Carolina school” aims at quantifying degrees of euroscepticism, the Sussex group intro-
duced a qualitative distinction between “hard” and “soft” euroscepticism. “Hard” euroscepticism
refers to a principled rejection of European integration that is ultimately incompatible with EU
membership. “Soft” euroscepticism is not opposed to integration as such, but rejects the current
state of European politics as well as the trajectory towards an “ever closer union” (Szcerbiak and
Taggart, 2008, pp. 7-8).
Mudde (2012, p. 194) notes that in the face of low salience of Europe and euroscepticism, it can
be surprisingly difficult to determine whether a party is soft eurosceptic, hard eurosceptic, or not
eurosceptic at all. However, in the case of the AfD, which emerged as an anti-Euro party and drew
up their first full-length manifesto in the context of the 2014 European election, there is clearly
no lack of salience. The hard/soft distinction is therefore a useful template for the analysis of the
AfD’s ideology.
But it is not entirely obvious how euroscepticism relates to broader ideologies. In most West
European polities, parties position themselves within a two-dimensional (Kitschelt, 1995; Benoit
and Laver, 2006) or perhaps even three-dimensional (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk, 2012) space. The
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everyday language of politics, however, still relies on the traditional left-right-dichotomy, and most
West Europeans are quite happy to place themselves on a unidimensional left-right-scale (Lo,
Proksch, and Gschwend, 2014). While the precise meaning of “left” and “right” may vary across
time and space (Huber and Inglehart, 1995), left-right-placement usually reflects the perceived
distance between voters and parties as well as value-based preferences (Knutsen, 1997). The focal
value on the right-hand side of this spectrum is inequality (that can be the result of some “natural
order”, mandated by tradition and authority, or the product of some market mechanism). The
most important value on the left-hand side is equality (see e.g. Bobbio, 1997), realised through
state regulation and redistribution of resource that may or may not infringe on liberty and property
rights.
Data reported in Ray’s (1999) early seminal contribution suggest that eurosceptic parties were
by and large located at both ends of the political spectrum during the 1990s. The analysis by Marks
et al. (2006), which draws on more recent data, confirms precisely such a curvilinear pattern, at least
for Western Europe. But even at the very (right) extreme of the political spectrum, euroscepticism
is neither omnipresent nor universally “hard” (Vasilopoulou, 2013). Therefore, a new party such
as the AfD must be very carefully evaluated before it can be classified as right-wing, populist,
eurosceptic, or all of the above.
Conditions for radical right success: Demand, context, and supply
Support for Radical Right parties varies considerably across time and political systems. The bur-
geoning literature has identified three groups of factors that can help to make sense of this variation:
“Demand-side” variables refer to individual features such us gender, formal education, class, and,
most importantly, political disaffection and anti-immigration attitudes (Brug and Fennema, 2007)
that make voters more or less susceptible to right-wing mobilisation. Their effect is moderated by
contextual conditions, which include institutional factors (e.g. the electoral system or the degree
of political centralisation), socio-economic conditions (e.g. the unemployment rate or the annual
number of new asylum applications), and political variables such as the salience of the immigration
issue for other parties and the media, or the willingness of the elites to co-operate with the Radical
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Right (Arzheimer, 2009).
Demand-side and contextual variables collectively form the external environment to which a
Radical Right party has to adapt, at least in the short term.2 A third group of variables, however,
is more or less under the control of the party. Such “supply-side” factors include the party’s policy
proposals, candidates for office, and general public appearance.3 Amongst these, past research has
highlighted the availability of a “charismatic leader” as a precondition for Radical Right success,
although this hypothesis is highly contested (Brug and Mughan, 2007).
More recently, David Art (2011) has developed a more nuanced account that stresses the im-
portance of party activists in general. In a nutshell, Art argues that the trajectory of Radical
Right parties hinges on the nascent party’s ability to attract a sufficient number of the right type
of activists, which in turn depends on historical legacies and the initial reaction of mainstream po-
litical actors to the new party (Art, 2011, p. 31). To have a chance of electoral success, a new party
needs many “moderates”, i.e. nationalists who credibly subscribe to the rules of liberal democracy
and steer clear of biological racism and neo-nazism. Ideally, these moderates should also have
high social-economic status (SES) and a degree of political experience outside the Radical Right
(Art, 2011, p. 33). Conversely, the emerging party should try to curb the number of “opportunist”
members without strong political convictions and to avoid attracting any “extremist” activists who
are openly hostile to parliamentary democracy: The latter group is prone to infighting over (highly
fragmented) political principles, unwilling to temper their political demands in order to appeal to
more moderate voters, and provide an easy target for any attempts to ostracise the new party.
Moreover, they are often unexperienced (Art, 2011, pp. 35-40).
Whilst this article is chiefly concerned with the question of whether the AfD can at all be
classified as Radical Right, Art’s theory of radical right mobilisation provides a useful template for
the next section and puts the AfD’s electoral appeal in perspective.
2Most parties will of course try to alter this environment to their advantage.
3In a broader sense, the party’s organisational structures and deployment of campaign funds could also go under
that rubric, although these obviously depend on recruitment and supply of external resources.
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Euroscepticism and the radical right in Germany
The lack of successful eurosceptic and right-wing parties
German MPs generally support European integration and even subscribe to a “deep core belief”
of “the EU as a good thing” (Kropp, 2010, p. 140). Almost all parliamentary parties in Germany
are staunch proponents of European political integration. On the right, both the FDP and the
CDU/CSU have supported and shaped European integration from its inception in the 1950s,
although the small Bavarian CSU has been occasionally been more critical of the commission and
some European policies than its sister party. On the left, the SPD and the Greens have taken a
similar stance, both in opposition and in government (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011, pp. 295-296).
Only the Left party have voted consistently against the treaties of Maastricht, Nice, and Lisbon,
because they reject the “neo-liberal” Single European Market, the monetary and budgetary policies
mandated by the Stability and Growth Pact, and the “militaristic” Common Foreign and Security
Policy. But even the Left party have declared themselves pro-European in principle at these
occasions (Wimmel and Edwards, 2011, pp. 306-308), which makes them soft eurosceptics.
Otherwise, German euroscepticism has been confined to a number of unsuccessful single-issue
fringe groups such as the Pro-Deutschmark party, and to the country’s three Radical Right parties
(Lees, 2008): the Republicans, the DVU, and the NPD. While all three had occasional successes
in state elections and the Republicans even were represented in the 1989-1994 EP, their support
proved fickle, and neither of them has ever won representation in the Bundestag. Compared to
other West European countries, this weakness of the Radical Right appears anomalous and makes
Germany a large negative outlier in a statistical model of radical right voting in Western Europe
that controls for demand-side and contextual factors (Arzheimer, 2009).
Art’s assessment of Radical Right mobilisation in Germany (Art, 2011, pp. 190-208), however,
provides a plausible explanation for this lack of right-wing success. German elites have stigmatised
National Socialism and criminalised the use its symbols very early on whilst offering nationalist
a home in the mainstream centre-right. This strongly discouraged ‘moderates’ and ‘opportunists’
from joining the NPD, DVU, or the Republicans. These parties in turn have always had a fixation
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with the past (Ignazi, 1992; Kitschelt, 1995), which ruled them out as serious political players and
made it easy to create and maintain a cordon sanitaire between them and the main parties.
Against this backdrop, the meteoric rise of the AfD and its ability to steer clear of any Nazi
connotations is a very unusual4 and significant development. Arguably, this success was only
possible because the party was formed by “moderates” with very high SES, considerable civic skills,
and some political experience (detailed in the next seciont), and rests on the party’s continuing
ability to ward off “extremists”, or at least activists that are perceived as too extreme in the German
context. This makes the question of the AfD’s classification all the more pertinent.
The making of the “Alternative for Germany”
The AfD began its political life in September 2012 when a group of disaffected CDU members
including Konrad Adam (born 1942), Alexander Gauland (born 1941), and Bernd Lucke (born
1962) founded a political action group called “Wahlalternative 2013” (an electoral alternative for
the 2013 General election). While none of them played a leading role in the CDU, all three
had been party members for several decades and were reasonably prominent figures: Adam and
Gauland are well-known conservative journalists, while Lucke is a professor of economics who has
been instrumental in organising two petitions by academic economists against the various bailout
packages.
However, the AfD should not be considered a splinter party from the CDU, because the founding
members were recruited from a broader centre-right background: Other signatories included 28
university professors (almost all of them economists), entrepreneurs and managers, and a former
state party chair of the FDP (the Liberal party). The Wahlalternative’s short manifesto5 demanded
that Germany should not guarantee any foreign sovereign debt, that all members of the Eurozone
should be free to re-introduce national currencies or to join new currency unions, and that any
further transfer of German sovereignty should be subject to a referendum.
Initially, the Wahlalternative was organised as a pressure group that supported the “Federation
4The ‘Law and Order Party’ (PRO) of the early 2000s initially took a similar approach, but was not interested
in euroscepticism and remained confined to the city-state of Hamburg.
5The original manifesto is archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20120923000310/http://www.wa2013.de/
index.php?id=208 .
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of Independent Voters”, a fledgling umbrella organisation for community-based, voter associations
that are often dominated by the owners of small local business. In January 2013, both organ-
isations jointly drew up a slate of candidates for the state election in Lower Saxony. However,
the list polled just over one per cent of the vote, much less than the five per cent required for
parliamentary representation. Subsequently, the two groups parted ways, and in February 2013
the Wahlalternative’s leadership formally founded the AfD as a political party, with the stated
intention to run in the upcoming federal election on September 22. Adam, Lucke, and Frauke
Petry (born 1975), a chemist and entrepreneur from the eastern state of Saxony, were elected to
jointly lead the party.
By July, the party had drawn up a short manifesto that focused on monetary and fiscal policies,
had set up branches in all 16 Länder, and had attracted more than 10,000 members.6 In the end,
the AfD garnered 4.7 per cent of the vote, the best result for any party competing for the first time
since 1953. While the AfD narrowly missed the electoral threshold, this result was widely seen as a
remarkable achievement that gained them a foothold in the political system and gave them access
to state funding.
Over the following six months, the party focused on broadening their programmatic profile and
shedding the image of the single-issue party. During this time, it became clear that there was
considerable potential for conflict within the party. In some state-level branches, the leadership
resigned or was ousted over allegations of financial, political, or personal misconduct.7 More
importantly, it became clear that various factions (conservatives, liberals, right-leaning Christian
Democrats and perhaps even Christian fundamentalists) were warring for influence within the
party. In January/February 2014, a party conference that was supposed to select the candidates
for the European election had to be suspended for a week, because the delegates could not agree
on a slate. In March, another party conference rejected a change to the statutes that would have
6Merkur Online, http://www.merkur-online.de/aktuelles/politik/alternative-deutschland-afd-zustrom-enorm-ueber-10000-mitglieder-zr-2873622.
html (03/07/2014).
7RPOnline 01/12/2013, http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/joerg-burger-ist-neuer-afd-chef-in-nrw-aid-1.
3857120 (03/07/2014), Spiegel Online 28/12/2013, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
afd-lucke-will-hessischen-landesvorsitzenden-abwaehlen-lassen-a-941072.html (03/07/2014), Zeit On-
line 14/06/2014, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-06/afd-thueringen-ruecktritt (03/07/2014).
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made it possible for Lucke to become sole party leader.8 Lucke barely managed to take control of
a debate on the party’s position on homosexuality (started by himself) and struggled to enforce a
party line that stops short of open populism and hard euroscepticisim.
The most visible split within the party concerned the question of its future membership in a
political group in the European Parliament. While Lucke was adamant that the AfD should join
the ECR, some of the party’s rank-and-file and the party’s youth organisation “Young Alternative”
would rather have worked with the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group. Things
came to a head when the Young Alternative invited Nigel Farage to give a lecture in Cologne.9
Lucke intervened but could neither forestall the event, nor was he successful in reprimanding
Marcus Pretzell, one of the organisers and also a member of the party’s executive committee and
a candidate for the EP election.
Electorally, none of this did the party any harm. In the polls, support for the AfD had been
consistently in the range of six to eight per cent. In the actual election, they won 7.1 per cent of
the vote, which entitled them to seven seats in the European Parliament – as many as the Left
party and more than the CSU or the FDP have won. The list of elected candidates includes only
two women and reflects the bourgeois background of the party leadership.10 On June 12, the seven
joined the ECR, making it the third-largest faction in the EP.
8Süddeutsche Online 23/03/2014, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/europa-parteitag-afd-lehnt-sanktionen-gegen-russland-ab-1.
1919526 (03/07/2014).
9Deutsche Welle Online 29/03/2014, http://www.dw.de/united-against-the-european-union/a-17530053
(03/07/2014).
10Lucke himself, Hans-Olaf Henkel, the former president of the Umbrella Organisation of Ger-
man Industry (BDI), who favours a minimal state and has likened the EU to the former So-
viet Union(Handelsblatt 03/10/2011, http://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kolumnen/kurz-und-schmerzhaft/
henkel-trocken-use-eudssr/4681178.html (03/07/2014)), Bernd Kölmel, a public servant with the Baden-
Württemberg State Court of Auditors, Beatrix von Storch, an insolvency lawyer and fringe Christian-conservative
homphobe activist, Joachim Starbatty, a retired professor of economics who has repeatedly (though unsuccessfully)
sued the government over the Euro, Ulrike Trebesius, a civil engineer, and the aforementioned Marcus Pretzell, a
lawyer and property developer.
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An analysis of the “Alternative”
A quantitative analysis of the AfD’s 2013 European election manifesto
Even for European elections, German parties tend to formulate detailed manifestos that cover a lot
of policy domains. The AfD is no exception to that rule. The 2014 European election manifesto is
the party’s first full-length policy document and therefore very well suited for assessing the party’s
official policy positions. To provide context for its analysis, the manifestos of the main parties, the
leftist Pirates, and the right-wing extremist NPD were analysed, too.
At 4,894 words, the AfD’s manifesto is close to the median length of 5,852 words. A number
of function words (articles, conjunctions, prepositions etc.) were removed from the files. Running
headers or footers, tables of contents and adverts were also discarded, but preambles and prefaces
by the party leaders were retained. Because German is an inflected language, the “Snowball”
stemming algorithm was applied to prepare the texts for quantitative analysis. Stemming aims
at reducing words to their roots by removing suffixes and affixes so that different inflected forms
are grouped together as a single item. While stemming is less accurate than full lemmatisation
(determining the dictionary form of inflected words), it can be carried out quickly and efficiently
to reduce the complexity of a text, and the loss in precision does not matter much in practical
applications (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, p. 272).
Although a number of very common German words had been discarded in the first step, some
stems such as “Europ” and “EU” appear very frequently in all manifestos and are thus not useful
for discriminating between parties. Therefore, the one per cent most frequent stems were removed.
Following Grimmer and Stewart (2013, p. 273), very rare stems that collectively make up one per
cent of the total corpus as well as stems that were exclusively used by a single party (typically the
party name) were also disregarded.
The remaining 4,430 stems give a very clear impression of the AfD’s priorities. Amongst the
15 most frequent concepts in the AfD manifesto are “member states”, “Eurozone”, “ECB”, and
“institutions”. None of these words is amongst the top priorities of any other party. However, the
analysis also reveals some similarities. “Competition” features prominently in the AfD’s manifesto,
11
Party Five most frequent words/stems
Left regional work combine ecological society
Green ecological human rights green Euro refugee
Pirates data oppose society access allow
SPD allow work education citizens (female) democratic
CDU co-operation worldwide digital need job
FDP opportunity freedom liberal citizens (female) responsible
AFD member state demand Euro eurozone reject
CSU Brussels allow future freedom needs
NPD (German) people Brussels today foreign domain
Table 1: The Five Most Frequent words/stems in Nine Election Manifestos
but also crops up frequently in the respective platforms of the FDP and the CDU. “Work” is a
common concern of the Left party and the SPD, and both Christian Democratic parties frequently
talk about “jobs”. Even looking at just the top five words most frequently used by each party gives
a good idea of what they stand for (see Table
The observation that the usage of certain words conveys information on ideological proximity
and distance between parties has been formalised by Slapin and Proksch (2008), who derive a sta-
tistical model that links word frequency to an underlying left-right dimension. Slapin and Proksch
also develop an estimation procedure they call “wordfish”, which recovers ideological positions from
political texts and ideological content of words while controlling for differences in the wordiness of
political documents and the global distribution of words. Unlike the related “wordscore” method
(Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003), “wordfish” does not require anchor texts and is thus ideally
suited for uncovering the positions of new parties relative to a set of more familiar political actors.
For the present analysis, the words and nine parties were simultaneously scaled using version
1.3 of Slapin and Proksch’s wordfish package for the R statistical system. The algorithm converged
quickly on the point estimates. 95 per cent confidence intervals were generated by a parametric
bootstrap procedure (a method that does not rely on a normal distribution of the estimates) using
500 draws (Slapin and Proksch, 2008, p. 710).11 Again, there were no convergence problems. The
words12 most closely tied to left ideology are “Kürzungspolitik” (austerity policies), “erwerbslos”
(unemployed), “Altersarmut” (pensioner poverty), “Migrantinnen” (an inclusive and neutral term
11The Graphs show the average of the boot-strapped point estimates. For the b parameters that determine word
“loadings” on the ideological dimension, these tend to differ somewhat from the maximum likelihood estimates, but
for the ω parameters, the two sets are virtually identical.
12For the sake of readability, words are used here instead of the actual stems.
12
for migrants), “Sozialcharta” (social charter), “EU-Politik” (EU politics), “Profit” (profit, a more
derogatory term than “Gewinn”), “Rüstungsproduktion” (production of arms), “unbefristed” (open-
ended, as in open-ended contract), and “nationalistisch” (nationalistic).
The most right-wing words are “fremd” (foreign or strange), “Volk” (the (German) people, in a
very emphatic sense), “verhängnisvoll” (fatal or ominous), “einerseits” (on the one hand), “bürger-
fern” (removed or insulated from the interests of ordinary citizens), “Asylbewerber” (asylum seek-
ers), “Gender” (as in gender mainstreaming or similar bugbears of the right), “gängeln” (to boss
around someone, typically used with reference to the behaviour of bureaucrats), “Bolognaprozess”
(the implementation of the Bolgna accord in German Higher Education), and “schleichend” (creep-
ing, typically referring to slow but sinister political change). As this vocabulary reflects both the
socio-cultural and the economic dimension of the left-right dichotomy, the scaling displays a high
degree of face validity.
Estimates for the party positions are very precise (Figure
Both the CSU and the AfD appear to the right of the FDP, slightly closer to the NPD than
to the CDU. The confidence intervals for their positions overlap, which implies that they are
statistically indistinguishable.13 Lucke has repeatedly claimed that his party is neither left nor
right14 and even stated that the AfD represents a new breed of party (“Partei neuen Typs”) at
their founding conference15 – a very awkward pun on the Stalinisation of East Germany’s Socialist
Unity party in the 1940s. But their manifesto places them firmly at the far right of the political
spectrum.
The position of the CSU is perhaps more surprising, because the Bavarian Christian Democrats
have been a fixture of German politics since 1945. But the party has nonetheless been described
as anti-immigration and (borderline) right-wing populist in the literature (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and
Scheepers, 2002; Falkenhagen, 2013). Former leader Franz-Josef Strauß famously declared that
“there must be no democratic party right of the CSU” (Raschke and Tils, 2013, 253, my emphasis).
13However, in the vast majority of the 500 bootstrap samples, the CSU is estimated to be slightly more right-wing
than the AfD.
14E.g. Spiegel Online 22/03/2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
afd-parteitag-in-erfurt-bernd-lucke-attackiert-medien-a-960230.html (07/07/2014).
15Zeit Online 18/03/2013, http://www.zeit.de/2013/17/alternative-fuer-deutschland-ausrichtung
(07/07/2014).
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More recently, the party has also steered an ambiguous course towards the EU.16 While the content
of their 2014 manifesto may already reflect concerns about the emerging competition from the AfD,
the document is nonetheless in line with the CSU’s traditional position at the very margin of the
established party system.
Is the 2013 manifesto radical, populist, and eurosceptic?
Against this backdrop, the estimates for both the AfD and the CSU are highly plausible. The
general left-right measure paints, however, a very broad-brushed picture of the AfD’s political pro-
gram. Assessing the question whether the AfD is not only on the right but also radical/extremist,
populist, and eurosceptic requires a close reading of its manifesto.
In the theory section, “nativism”, i.e. a mixture of nationalism and xenophobia was proposed as
a criterion for separating the Radical Right from other right-wing parties. In line with their overall
position on the right of the political spectrum, the AfD is certainly unusually prone (by German
standards) to display national symbols and to emphasise Germany’s national interest. “Mut zu
Deutschland” (roughly translated: dare to stand by Germany) was the title of their manifesto and
their main slogan for the EP 2014 campaign. The phrase is still used prominently on the party’s
main website, their social media profiles, and in other party material. The slogan alludes to the
common right-wing argument that national pride is systematically discouraged in Germany but
was deployed in a more specific sense during the campaign: the AfD wants Germany to act more
assertively within the European Union.17
The corresponding section, however, is one of the shortest in the manifesto and makes rather
modest demands. The AfD blames the member state governments for breaking the treaties (partic-
ularly the Stability and Growth Pact), it demands that the EP should launch a public inquiry into
the details of bailout measures, and it suggests (without going into details) that Germany should
16With the tacit blessing of the leadership, a group of backbenchers have voted against the bailout legistlation
and subsequently asked the Federal Constitutional Court to nullify these bills. The party’s core political project
in the 2013-2017 parliament is a special road charge for cars registered abroad that would probably violate of EU
law, and the central plank of their 2014 campaign was the slogan “kick welfare cheats out”, which referred to alleged
“benefit tourists” from the eastern EU member states.
17This interpretation was emphasised by the design of the campaign posters, which surrounded the “EU” in
“Deutschland” with the 12 European stars (shown in Figure
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have a greater say within the European institutions. However, the main opponent for the AfD is
an unholy alliance between the EU institutions and Germany’s “Altparteien” (old, i.e. established
parties - a term the AfD has borrowed from the Green party of the 1980s). But one would be
hard-pressed to find any statement that is nationalistic in the usual sense of the term in this or in
fact in any other part of the manifesto.
The section on immigration and asylum also strikes a rather conciliatory tone. The AfD
subscribes to the principles of free movement and free choice of residence for all EU citizens,
although they want to limit benefits (of which they are critical in general) to long-term residents
and their offspring. Moreover, the AfD acknowledges the problems brought about by demographic
change and supports a point-based immigration regime for non-EU citizens. Finally, the AfD
commits itself to a “humane” asylum system, which implies more financial and logistic support for
the member states in the South, common standards for accommodation, and labour market access
for asylum seekers. Taken together, these positions are not overly restrictive by German standards
and do not display any nativist tendencies.
The AfD rejects Turkish EU membership flat-out and mentions “geographical, cultural and
historical borders” in this context. But apart from this, and from a single reference to Europe’s
“Christian-occidental values”, religion and culture, which are often used as politically acceptable
codewords for non-European ethnic groups (Zúquete, 2008), are not at all mentioned in the text.
Judging by its manifesto, the AfD is therefore not a Radical Right, let alone an Extreme Right
party.
Is the AfD populist? If one defines populism as a “thin ideology”, then there is very little in
the manifesto that would support such a claim. The AfD is highly critical of “Brussels”, and of the
mainstream parties in Germany. They also argue that the ongoing financial crisis was to a large
degree caused by irresponsible behaviour of the banks, which should be regulated more tightly.
Moreover, they want to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU in general and demand that
future enlargements as well as important decisions on the Euro should be put to a referendum.
But that alone does hardly make them populists. Their manifesto does not contain a single
reference to “elites”, the “political class”, or the “eurocrats”. Corruption is mentioned only once,
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in the innocuous context of the UN’s anti-corruption charter. But even if one opts for a broader,
softer definition that primarily treats populism as a style of political communication “that refers
to the people” (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 322) there is nothing in the manifesto that would
appear as particularly populist in that sense.
The AfD’s manifesto does not even conform with every day notions of populism that imply
appeal to emotions, oversimplification, and a degree of opportunism (Mudde, 2004, pp. 542-543).
On the contrary: The AfD’s manifesto contains lengthy references to economic theory, is largely
written in a rather technical and stilted language and even contains a couple of footnotes that
cross-reference political demands to articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
That leaves the issue of euroscepticism. The AfD is clearly not a “hard” eurosceptic party. They
are opposed to the currency union in its present form, to current and future bailouts, and more
generally to a federal European state. But at the same time, they are committed to the European
Union as such and have dropped their erstwhile demand for a return to the Deutschmark from their
manifesto. While they want to strengthen the principle of subsidiarity (which was established in
the Treaty of Maastricht at the behest of the German Länder), they don’t intend to reduce the EU
to a trade bloc. Although they are highly suspicious of secretive intergovernmental co-operation in
Justice and Home Affairs, they support the pursuit of a Common Foreign and Security Policy based
on lowest common denominator solutions. Taken together, “soft euroscepticism” best describes the
political positions articulated in the manifesto.
The Alternative’s internet presence
In Germany, parties are legally obliged to draw up comprehensive manifestos and lodge them
with the Federal Returning Officer. These platforms are routinely scrutinised by researchers and
the media. The lack of any obviously radical and populist content in the AfD’s manifesto could
therefore be misleading. Indeed, a speech delivered by Konrad Adam on June 27, 201318 gives
a rather different impression. Adam encourages party members to become “dangerous citziens”
18http://www.alternativefuer.de/konrad-adam-wie-wird-man-zu-einem-gefaehrlichen-buerger/ .
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(“gefährliche Bürger”) who dare to take on the elites. Politicians of other parties are portrayed as
greedy, lazy, and incompetent predators who are after the money of ordinary taxpayers and sell
out the national interest to the EU, and the mainstream media help them to cover up.
Other speeches documented on the website, however (four by Lucke, one by Starbatty and one
by Henkel) strike a similar, yet clearly more moderate tone. Starbatty and Henkel in particular
discuss intricacies of social and economic policy in great detail, while Lucke often focuses on his
vision for the further development of the party. None of these speeches could be considered populist
or radical.19
To get a more rounded impression of the party’s appeal, it therefore makes sense to analyse the
party’s presence on the internet. The party’s main website (http://www.alternativefuer.de) is
built with the wordpress platform. It is professionally designed and maintained and currently (July
2014) consists of more than 1,300 unique HTML pages20 plus 62 PDF documents. Many pages
contain redundant content because they serve as archives that bring together posts related to a
specific author, tag, category, or date of publication. Other pages are simply of an administrative
nature (e.g. contact information). The following analysis is therefore restricted to 371 blog-post like
pages, which contain comments on media reports, current events, or simply document statements
by prominent party leaders.
For the analysis, only text in the main body of the pages was extracted. Stopword removal and
stemming were conducted as outlined above. The resulting corpus consists of 45,990 words, which
can be reduced to 9,745 stems. Obviously, posts on a website serve a function that is different from
that of the manifesto, and this is reflected in the language used. A simple count demonstrates that
the AfD is chiefly talking about itself and its leadership. “AfD” (573), “Alternative” (338), and
“Deutschland” (“Germany”, 531) are amongst the five most popular stems. Also very prominent is
the name of Bernd Lucke (274), who clearly overshadows his fellow leaders Adam (42) and Petry
(48). Far more important than Adam and Petry are deputy leaders Gauland (151) and Henkel
19More generally, Lucke and his party are the object of very intense scrutiny by their political adversaries and the
mainstream media, yet there are very few verifiable public statements by Lucke or other members of the national
leadership that could qualify as right-wing populist (see the borderline examples in Hler and Roeser, 2014, p. 37).
20This number excludes automatically generated overview pages for authors, tags, categories, and year of publi-
cation.
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(90), while (female) deputy leader Patricia Casale is not mentioned at all.21
Taken together, the website leaves no doubt that the AfD is a right-wing party. Only about 60
per cent of the references to “Germany” are due to the use of the full party name. The party simply
talks a lot about Germany, everything German (253), Europe (379), the Euro (327), the EU (175),
and the Eurozone (62). The tone is slightly harsher than that of the manifesto, with the occasional
attack on the ECJ or refugees “who abuse the right to hospitality”. While “Volk” (people) is rare,
the more intellectual “Bevölkerung” (population, 42) and particularly “Bürger” (citizen(s), 169)
crop up much more often. Attacks on the AfD’s political competitors are also frequent: the CSU
is mentioned 41 times, the FDP receives 75 references, and the CDU is mentioned 104 times.
But all in all, there is still little evidence of populism or right-wing radicalism. Immigrants
and immigration are mentioned only 23 times (equivalent to a single mention in six per cent of all
posts), and not necessarily in a negative context. Bulgaria and Romania are each referenced less
than 15 times, Muslims hardly play a role at all, and even Turkey and the Turks are mentioned
only 23 times. Remarkably, the AfD shows an unusual degree of sympathy for Russia and distrust
for the US, both common in German Radical Right circles. But as far as foreigners are concerned,
the main focus is clearly Greece and the Greeks (297 references).
The main website does not, however, include any interactive elements (guest books, comments,
fora). Instead, the party relies on social media websites to interact with members, supporters, the
media, and the general public. Facebook is of particular importance for the party. As of July
2014, the official fanpage of the AfD’s federal organisation counts almost 122,000 “likes”.22 This is
nearly twice as much as the SPD (just under 75,000) or the CDU (almost 84,000) can muster. On
Twitter, the AfD federal organisation’s handle has only about 9,600 “followers”. The analysis will
therefore focus on the AfD’s Facebook fanpage.
21Another relatively prominent male is Starbatty (20), now a MEP. On the other hand, there are only five
references to female MEP von Storch , and the second female MEP Trebesius is mentioned just once. The image
of the party leadership that the website projects is reflected in the coverage by the German media: For the period
from February 1 2013 to July 11 2014, LexisNexis lists 2096 news items mentioning both the AfD and Lucke and
622 items that refer to Henkel and the AfD. Adam, however is mentioned only 232 times, Gauland 231 times and
Petry 185 times. von Storch is referenced 169 times, Starbatty 150 times, Trebesius 20 times, Pretzell four times,
while there is just one article that mentions Casale.
22All 16 state level chapters as well as various regional and local chapters have set up their own fanpages, but
those have much smaller fanbases, ranging from several thousands to less than a hundred.
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From a party’s point of view, fanpages are attractive because they provide a focus for political
conversation about the party that is actually under the control of the party. Whereas communica-
tion on Twitter is largely unmoderated, spontaneous, and ephemeral, Facebook fanpages resemble
traditional home pages. Crucially, fanpage administrators can remove posts, restrict who may
post, and even ban individual users from the page.
Facebook has created an application programming interface (API) that makes it easy to pro-
grammatically access posts on fanpages as well as their meta data. Data were collected using
version 0.4 of the “Rfacebook” package for R. The AfD launched its fanpage on March 3, 2013,
and posted for the first time on March 7. As of July 11, 2014, the AfD have updated their status
1,702 times, or roughly 24 times per week, with markedly higher frequencies immediately after
the launch of the party, during the federal campaign, during the candidate selection conference
in January/February, and finally during the European parliamentary campaign.23 Many of these
updates include images that combine text and pictures. Figure 2 is quite a typical specimen that
brings together a photo of Gauland, a short quote (“Germany is not the USA’s doormat”), and the
party logo and signature blue background. It is well known that such photo updates create quicker
and stronger reactions with Facebook users and are privileged by Facebook’s selection algorithm.
Moreover, text within images is never truncated by Facebook and can be easily shared both on
Facebook and across other channels with minimal effort.
The use of such imagery shows the professionalism of the AfD’s social media team but is an
obstacle for text analysis, because the use of various fonts and designs renders reliable optical
character recognition virtually impossible. Fortunately, most images are complemented by some
text, which usually re-iterates the main points or raises some additional issues. The following
analysis is based on 1,223 posts that contain at least some text. Together, these posts make up
some 72,000 words.24
Facebook is a popular medium for political communication because links to other content on the
internet can be quickly posted (often with a preview of the other site’s content), distributed, and
23This number could be inflated, as the Facebook API returns about 264 posts which do neither contain messages
nor links, and which created no reactions. Presumably, these are either drafts or were retracted.
24This number includes URLs and symbols such as the hashtag sign.
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Figure 2: Montage of soundbite/logo
21
commented upon. Until July, the AfD had posted 1,622 unique URLs which point to 187 separate
domains. From these figures, it is clear that the AfD does not simply use Facebook to re-publish
the content of its main website. Indeed, there are only 69 links (less than five per cent) to the
party’s national website, and 70 links to the websites of 19 local or regional party organisations.
The vast majority (795) of links refer to other content on Facebook. The party also makes
extensive use of video clips hosted on youtube.com (79). Amongst the other sites, welt.de (the right-
most mainstream broadsheet) and faz.net (a centre-right broadsheet) are particularly prominent
with 109 and 60 links, respectively. Other important mainstream sources include the business news
sites handelsblatt.com (68) and wiwo.de (29) as well as news magazines focus.de (92, centre-right)
and spiegel.de (58, centre-left). Finally, there is a host of links to various blogs and other websites.
In summary, the AfD use their Facebook page to direct attention to news articles that sup-
port the party’s positions, to “spin” stories on issues that will chime with their supporters, and
occasionally to poke fun at their political adversaries. But what exactly are they talking about
in the text that accompanies links, videos, and images? Amongst the most frequent words in the
posts are once more “AfD” (1,182), “Germany” (701), “Euro” (488) “alternative” (466), “EU” (400),
and “Lucke” (367). Again, other party leaders are mentioned far less often. Greece (together with
Greeks and “Athens”) feature prominently once more with 202 mentions and are far more important
than Turkey/Turks (48), Muslims/Islam (20), or Romania (9) and Bulgaria (8).
Apart from that, it is slightly easier to find populist rhetoric on the Facebook page than on
the main website. While “elites” (which by any reasonable definition would include many AfD
leaders) are hardly ever mentioned, there are ample references to a conflict between “politicians”
and “citizens” as well as many calls for protecting “freedom” and “democracy”. But even the most
overtly populist post, the party anthem “We don’t give up” is relatively tame: Germans are a “really
super people” (“ein wirklich tolles Volk”) who nonetheless “suffer”, Chancellor Merkel is accused
of treating “us” like a bunch of “right-less monkeys” while politicians more generally are guilty of
writing incomprehensible and self-serving laws. The only solution to this crisis is to vote for the
AfD.
Collectively, the AfD’s posts were “shared” (copied to users’ profiles or other pages) more than
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500,000 times. They received more than 1.9 million “likes” (on average, more than 1,100 per post)
and over 325,000 comments, which amounts to over 200 comments per post.
Bloggers and mainstream journalists have repeatedly suggested that the AfD buys phantom
fans and fake likes on Facebook. Comments, however, are much more difficult to simulate than
shares and likes, and even a cursory glance at the AfD’s page shows a remarkable level of real
political interaction between users.
Somewhat surprisingly, not just “fans” but any Facebook user may comment and even post new
content on the AfD’s page. As of July 11 2014, almost 79,000 user-generated posts are accessible
on the page. This is roughly equivalent to a corpus of 3.4 million words. Together, the posts have
attracted more than 212,000 comments and just over 51,000 shares.
While members and supporters dominate, some critical voices exist amongst those who post
on the AfD’s page. At 7,980, the number of original posters is relatively low, and the distribution
of posts across users is heavily skewed to the right (18.7). The median number of posts per user
is just one. A minority of five per cent has posted 30 times or more, and a tiny group of 25 users
(less than 0.5 per cent) is collectively responsible for a quarter of all posts.25 While some of these
25 show off their sympathy for the AfD in their profile pictures and three hold party offices at the
local level, none of them plays any significant role within the party or holds public office.
In terms of content, the 79,000 user-generated posts resemble the material posted by the AfD
themselves. Again, “AfD” (26,311), “Germany” (12,816), “Euro” (11,152), and EU (9,295) are
amongst the most frequent words, while “Bulgaria”, “Romania”, “Turkey”, and Muslims/Islam are
of lesser importance. However, quite a few posts strike a tone that is markedly different from the
party’s carefully crafted statements. Resentment and nationalism colour many posts. Complaints
about ungrateful immigrants, privileged homosexuals, and greedy politicians are frequent. Links
to obscure right-wing sites abound.
The AfD have created a space for their supporters where this kind of talk is tolerated. But only
up to a point: Racist slurs and even common expletives are very rare. This does not prove, but
suggests, continuous interventions by the party. In various comments, the AfD has made it clear
25The number could be even smaller, as three of the most prolific posters have very similar surnames: Otto Blank,
Andrea Blanc, and Andrea Cnalb.
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that they are actively monitoring the page, and that they delete racist or otherwise illegal content
including links to right-wing extremist websites. There is no way of knowing how many items have
been posted and subsequently deleted, but the party is treading a narrow line. On the one hand,
the AfD does not want to annoy their most vocal supporters on the internet, on the other, Lucke
is very wary of allegations of populism and radicalism.
Conclusion
This article set out to answer the question whether the AfD is a right-wing, populist, and eu-
rosceptic party. A careful quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 2014 EP manifesto shows
that the AfD is indeed located at the far-right end of Germany’s political spectrum because of their
nationalism, their resistance against state support for sexual diversity and gender mainstreaming,
and their market liberalism. They do, however, not qualify as “radical”: There is no evidence
of nativism or populism in their manifesto, which sets them apart from most of the other new
right parties in Europe. Moreover, their euroscepticisim is of the “soft” variety. This assessment is
largely confirmed by an analysis of the AfD’s communication on the web, although statements by
their facebook fans hint at more radical currents amongst supporters and the party rank-and-file.
Important nuances not withstanding, their current programmatic appeal most closely resembles
that of the CSU. But while the CSU is essentially an “ethno-regional” (Falkenhagen, 2013) party
that does not stand candidates outside Bavaria, the AfD aims at attracting a much bigger and
broader national constituency.
Continued electoral support for the AfD would have profound repercussions for the existing
German party system, most obviously by undermining the position of the CDU, which so far
have fared much better than other Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe (Bale and
Krouwel, 2013). In the longer run, it would directly or indirectly affect domestic, immigration, and
European integration policies. Thus far, Chancellor Merkel has ruled out coalitions with the AfD.
If the FDP’s decline proves permanent and the AfD prevails, maintaining this cordon sanitaire will
weaken the position of the CDU by forcing it to exclusively enter coalitions with the parties of the
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Left. At the same time, the AfD’s success is already fuelling internal backlash from conservatives
against Merkel’s socially liberal policies.
Irrespective of the AfD’s perspectives for long-term survival, the fact that the party has done
so well in five consecutive elections reflects the scope of partisan dealignment in Germany and the
increasingly fluid nature of its party system. But does this remarkable mobilisation guarantee a
bright future for the AfD? Not necessarily. In absolute terms, the AfD’s support has essentially
stagnated, although the timing of the elections was close to optimal: In 2013, the AfD won 2.06
million votes, in the 2014 election it was 2.07 millions. In the eastern state elections, the AfD even
suffered a small net loss of some 18,000 votes compared to their state-level results in the European
election. Euroscepticism, the party’s current core issue, is still not very salient in Germany. In a
survey immediately before the EP election, only 47 per cent of the AfD’s own voters had a wholly
negative view of Germany’s membership in the EU. Only 22 per cent rejected both Juncker and
Schulz as president of the commission, and 40 per cent said they supported the AfD to register a
protest vote, not because of their policies.
Precisely what these policies are might therefore change over the near future. So far, the
“moderates” have dominated the party leadership. Lucke has been able to commit the AfD to
civic nationalism, financial prudence, and soft euroscepticisim, with Gauland and Adam catering
for a more broadly “liberal-conservative” right-wing audience that may feel left behind by Merkel’s
move to the centre. In 2014, Lucke’s creation more closely resembles the British Conservatives
than UKIP, let alone the French FN or the Austrian Freedom Party.
Yet Lucke’s control over the party seems to be wavering. His plans to replace the joint leadership
structure with a more traditional sole-leader role have been rejected by a party conference and have
been met with criticism from his colleagues.26 State and district party chapters are still struggling
to keep right-wing extremists out. Meanwhile, their new status as MEPs has given other leading
figures such as von Storch and Pretzell a platform. They represent less savoury brands of right-
wing politics that could ultimately prove more attractive to voters than Lucke’s polite exercises in
26FAZ Online 20/10/2014, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/machtkampf-in-der-afd-lucke-und-die-ruecktrittsdrohung-13220047.
html (07/11/2014), Spiegel Online 29/11/2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/
afd-bernd-lucke-laut-alexander-gauland-ein-kontrollfreak-a-1003889.html (29/11/2014).
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economic theory. Just how long the party resists that temptation remains to be seen.
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